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Abstract
We report evidence that salience may have economically signicant
e¤ects on homeownersborrowing behavior, through a bias in favour
of less salient but more costly loans. Survey evidence corroborates the
existence of such a bias. We outline a simple model in which some
consumers are biased and show that under plausible assumptions this
a¤ects prices in equilibrium. Market data support the predictions of
the model.
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1 Introduction
Households face many choices that require nancial judgment. When this
judgment falls short of the mark, households may make nancially sub-
optimal decisions. In some cases, failing to optimize entails a negligible
cost; in other cases, the cost is large. Depending on the market in question,
sub-optimal decisions of individual participants may or may not a¤ect the
market equilibrium.
This paper examines certain aspects of a decision faced by many house-
holds: making a debt-nanced acquisition of a home. We document some
strong indications that borrowing decisions are not always rational in the
housing market. The setting we examine is the Swedish housing market, in
which virtually all apartments are organized as housing co-operatives (co-
ops). Co-ops can, and frequently do, take on debt. As a result, a household
acquiring an apartment evaluates di¤erent combinations of personal loans
and co-op loans.
The Swedish housing market is interesting because the cost of nancing
an apartment through a co-op loan and through a personal loan di¤er sub-
stantially. Interest payments on personal loans are tax deductible, whereas
interest payments on co-op loans are not. As a result, individuals nanc-
ing their apartments through co-op loans face considerably higher borrow-
ing costs net of taxes. Despite this, co-op loans account for a considerable
share of apartment nancing: in 2008, the total debt held by Swedish co-ops
amounted to 220 billion SEK or about 31 billion USD, equivalent to more
than half of the total assessed value of these co-ops.1 The amount of money
left on the table is economically signicant: in 2006, the most recent year for
which there is information about co-op interest payments, co-ops on average
paid interest equivalent to about 20 USD per square meter.2 For an average
sized apartment (about 90 square meters, see Statistics Sweden, 2010a), this
would imply interest payments on co-op loans associated with their apart-
ment amounting to about 1800 USD. This amounts to an average potential
saving of about 540 USD per year and apartment if these loans were replaced
with tax deductible personal loans.
Co-op loans are less salient, in the sense that they are less visible and
easier for the consumer to ignore. Several factors contribute to make co-op
1Source: Statistics Sweden. 1 USD  7 SEK.
2Source: Statistics Sweden.
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loans less salient. Interest payments are not itemized in the monthly fees,
and only the aggregate debt of the co-op is stated in annual co-op reports.
When an apartment is for sale, the co-op loan which the buyer would be
servicing is not specied in the ad.
Empirical work in public economics has shown that salience may be an
important determinant of behavioral responses to taxation (Chetty et al,
2009; Chetty and Saez, 2009; Finkelstein, 2009). A parallel literature in
consumer nance has reported that the salience of the act of payment a¤ects
consumption (see, for example, Soman, 2003). In the light of this research,
it seems a priori plausible that loan salience may a¤ect borrowing decisions.
In the rst part of this paper, we report the results from a survey exam-
ining apartment ownersself-reported awareness of personal and co-op loans.
The results corroborate the view that co-op loans are less salient than per-
sonal loans. Most survey participants reported being well-informed about the
details of their personal mortgage loan but ignorant about loans taken out
by their co-op, including the interest rate paid by the co-op. In addition, the
vast majority had never considered the possibility of substituting co-op loans
for personal loans, suggesting that they do not hold an integrated view of the
nancial question at hand, i.e. how to best nance an apartment through a
combination of co-op loans and personal loans.
In the second part of the paper, we present a model in which biased
and unbiased consumers interact in the housing market and the bias distorts
market prices in equilibrium. We model the bias toward less salient debt
as a benet associated with co-op loans but not with personal loans. We
think of this as a psychological benet arising from co-op loans being less
salient. We assume that there is an idiosyncratic component to the utility
that an individual gets from an apartment. This is a realistic description of
most housing markets and in our model it prevents the separating equilib-
rium that would arise if di¤erent apartments where perfect substitutes. In
addition, we assume that individual market participants cannot carry out
arbitrage. The Swedish market is characterized by rent control and other re-
strictions on renting out apartments (see Lind, 2003, for details). Converting
owner-occupied apartments into rental apartments would typically entail a
signicant nancial loss. When each household owns a single apartment at
a time, transactions costs from moving make it unlikely that arbitrage will
correct prices.
In the third part of the paper, we examine whether co-op loans are fully
reected in market prices. This question has previously been addressed by
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Hjalmarsson and Hjalmarsson (2009) who examine the negative relationship
between the sales price and the present value of monthly fee payments to the
co-op. They base their analysis on the present value of co-op fees because
their data does not contain information about co-op loans. Hjalmarsson and
Hjalmarsson (2009) nd that a 100 SEK increase in the present value of fee
payments decreases the price by about 75 SEK, whereas market e¢ ciency
would require a price decrease of about 100 SEK.
We match market data from the source used by Hjalmarsson and Hjal-
marsson (2009) with a proprietary database of co-op balance sheets, thus
generating a unique data set in which we can observe actual co-op debt lev-
els for each apartment sale. Since the data also contains the fraction of co-op
ownership (and debt service) associated with each apartment we can identify
the amount of co-op debt assocatied with each apartment and thus to test
the capitalization hypothesis directly, rather than through a proxy such as
the present value of co-op fees.
Our main nding is that co-op loans are undercapitalized in apartment
prices and to a considerably larger extent than what is reported in Hjalmars-
son and Hjalmarsson (2009). Their data is from the period 2002-2005, in
which the tax treatment of personal and co-op loans was about the same,
implying a marginal rate of substitution close to negative one. Following a
tax reform implemented at the beginning of 2007 co-op loans became less
favorable than personal loans, implying that the marginal rate of substitu-
tion should be larger (in absolute size) in our data which covers the period
2007-2009. By contrast, we nd that a 100 SEK increase in the co-op loan
associated with an apartment decreases its price by only 20-30 SEK.
As an additional test, we extend our sample to include observations im-
mediately preceding a tax reform that changed the relative cost of personal
loans and co-op loans. In the last quarter of 2006 the Swedish government
announced that a change of the tax rules for co-ops would be enacted on 1
january 2007. Until this point, interest on co-op loans had been deductible
against a special co-op tax. The abolishment of this tax resulted in the large
wedge between the cost of nancing an apartment through co-op loans and
personal loans. All else being equal, this should make apartments with large
co-op loans less attractive relative to those with little or no co-op loans. By
contrast, our model predicts that apartment prices will be less responsive to
such relative price changes if some of the market participants are biased in
favor of less salient co-op loans. A comparison of the capitalization of co-op
loans in 2006 and 2007 suggests that the market did not react to this change
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in fundamentals. Apartment prices rose, consistent with the price e¤ect one
would expect following a decrease in the overall tax burden on co-ops, but
co-op loans do not have a larger negative e¤ect on apartment prices follow-
ing the tax reform, despite the more disadvantegous tax treatment from 2007
onwards.
At the end of the paper we discuss some policy implications of our nd-
ings. The observed market patterns are not necessarily ine¢ cient. If some
consumers prefer less salient debt and are willing to pay for it, then it is
not obvious that their welfare would be increased by switching to less costly
personal loans. On the other hand, it is possible that some households do
not realize the full costs of co-op loans. As we illustrate, the additional cost
attached to co-op loans may be considerable.
2 Survey results
As a starting point, we conducted a survey of co-op residents. The partici-
pants were asked about their personal mortgage loans and about the loans
of their co-ops. Survey data have a number of drawbacks, but Bucks and
Pence (2006) nd that homeowners in general report their mortgage terms
reasonably accurately, suggesting that this may be a valid point of depar-
ture. We also asked if they were aware of the tax advantage of personal loans
relative to co-op loans, and whether they had ever considered the possibility
of substituting personal loans for co-op loans. The purpose of the survey
was to get a better picture of how common it is for co-op residents to hold a
view of co-op loans that departs from strict economic rationality, but not to
attempt to identify the determinants of such a biased view.
The survey was conducted in February 2008, at the main train station
in Stockholm. Participation in the survey was conditional on owning, and
being resident in, a co-op apartment. 100 individuals took part in the survey,
which lasted approximately 3 minutes for each participant. Participants were
rewarded with a lottery ticket worth approximately USD 4. The mean age
of the participants was 45 years, with a minimum of 17 and a mamixum of
77. Equal numbers of men and women participated in the survey. About two
thirds of the sample had college education. About one third was currently,
or had previously been, a co-op board member.
The key results from the survey are as follows: (1) the vast majority of
respondents self-reported being well aware of the size of their personal mort-
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gage loan and the associated interest rate. (2) By contrast, the majority of
respondents reported being not even approximately aware of their co-op loan
size or the interest rate.on the co-op debt. (3) In addition, most respondents
had never even considered the possibility of substituting individually held
debt for co-op debt. These ndings indicate that many apartment owners
pay little attention to co-op loans, consistent with the view that co-op loans
are less salient. The results are presented in more detail below.
We asked survey participants if they knew the size of their personal mort-
gage loan and the associated interest rate. As shown in Figure 1, the great
majority reported knowing the exact size of their mortgage and the exact in-
terest rate they were paying. Of those that did not know the exact numbers,
about half knew them approximately. Only 5 percent of the partcipants did
not even approximately know the loan size, and only 13 percent did not even
approximately know the interest rate.
Figure 1
Awareness of own mortgage size and interest rateFigure 1
Awareness of own mortgage size and interest rate
"Do you know the size of your own
mortgage loan?"
Yes
No
Approx.
"Do you know what interest rate you are
paying on your own mortgage loan?"
Yes
Approx.
No
By contrast, only a minority of the participants in the survey reported
knowing the size of their co-op loan or the associated interest rate. 60 percent
of respondents did not even approximately know the loan size and 76 percent
did not even approximately know the interest rate.
Figure 2
Awareness of co-op debt size and interest rateFigure 2
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Awareness of co-op debt size and interest rate
"Do you know how much debt your co-op
has taken on?"
No Approx.
Yes
"Do you know what interest rate your co-op
is paying on its debt?"
No
Approx.
Yes
Not all co-ops have loans. Participants stating that their co-ops did not
have loans were entered into the data as knowing the exact loan size and the
exact interest rate. Participants reporting that they did not think that their
co-ops had loans, but were uncertain, were entered into the data as knowing
the approximate loan size and the approximate interest rate. This may cause
our measure of co-op loan awareness to be biased upwards.
In a nancial sense, personal loans and co-op loans are substitutes. An
important di¤erence is that personal loans are considerable more salient than
co-op loans. The lower salience is underscored by the survey participants
poor awareness of co-op loan size and/or interest rate. The low salience
of co-op loans may prevent them from being being replaced with personal
loans despite strong economic incentives for doing so. In fact, we found that
the vast majority (86 percent) of the survey participants had never even
considered the possibility of replacing co-op loans with personal loans.
Figure 3
Awareness of debt substitution
"Have you ever considered replacing co-op
debt with debt held individually by the co-op
members?"
Yes
No
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3 A simple model of the co-op market
Our survey results corroborate the view that many market participants have
a biased perception of a less salient form of debt nancing, co-op loans. An
important question is whether a bias at the individual level translates into
market prices that are ine¢ cient in a narrow economic sense. In the following
section, we make the assumption that some fraction of agents are biased and
model the interaction of biased and unbiased agents in the market place.
One approach for modelling quasi-rational behavior is to treat it as a
mistake that occurs when the agent converts raw information into a budget
set (Russell and Thaler, 1985). This allows for a distinction between individ-
ual di¤erences in (1) preferences, (2) information, and (3) the mapping from
the real world to the mental representation of a budget constraint. Having
arrived at a not-quite-accurate budget set, the agent optimizes in the same
way that a fully rational agent would.
Our model builds on this approach. Biased and unbiased agents solve the
same optimization problem, but the biased agents perceive a psychological
benet associated with less salient co-op loans. This captures the idea that
salience has an e¤ect on economic decisions that is similar to a higher cost,
consistent with the empirical ndings in Finkelstein (2009) and Chetty et al
(2009). The psychological benet of lower salience drives a wedge between
the perceived costs of the two types of loans.
3.1 The model
There is a continuum of agents on [0; 1] who live for two periods. At the
beginning of the rst period each agent is endowed with one unit of housing
(an apartment). At the end of period 1 agents can sell their apartment and
buy a new one. Apartments have associated co-op loans that are either high
(Dh) or low (Dl; where Dh > Dl): We refer to these as high debt or low
debt apartments. The apartment prices associated with high and low debt
apartments are Ph and Pl, respectively.
Buyers use personal loans to pay the market price of an apartment, and
the market price does not include the co-op loan associated with the apart-
ment.3 We assume that the interest payments are tax deductible for personal
3The personal loan can be thought of as either personal mortgage loan or personal
savings with a required return equal to the mortgage rate.
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as well as co-op debt but the tax rates can di¤er. Letting  c,  p denote the
tax rate, the net cost of a unit of co-op and personal debt are given by
(1    c)r and (1    p)r, where the interest rate r is equal for the two types
of loans.4
In order to consider a new apartment, agents make two searches at the
end of the rst period. The model is tractable for any nite number of
searches, but extending the model in such a manner does not o¤er further
insight. Apartments are heterogeneous, which is captured through a sep-
arately additive idiosyncratic utility ui that agent i perceives for any new
apartment, with ui being uniformly distributed on the interval [ U;U ]:This
approach, which is similar to Stein (1995), captures gains from trade and
drives the trading in our model.5 For modelling convenience we assume that
all agents have zero utility (v0 = 0) from their initial apartments. We also
assume agents are not liquidity constrained, an assumption that is discussed
in more detail in the empirical section.
All agents solve the same maximization problem, but some agents use a
di¤erent mapping from the information set to the budget set because they get
an additional benet from less salient co-op loans that they dont get from
personal loans.6 Fraction  of all agents are unbiased (type j = u). Fraction
1   are biased (type j = b) and perceive a psychological benet from less
salient co-op loans. Salience could also be modeled as a psychological cost,
as in, for example, Chetty (2009), but since we are only concerned with the
relative cost of the two loans such an approach is equivalent to ours.
The psychological benet cj is proportional to the annual debt service.
4Frisell and Yasdih (2010) show that in recent years the spreads on personal mortgage
loans have typically been in the 0.5-1.0 percent range. While it is possible that co-ops
are able to negotiate slightly better rates, the small margins on personal mortgage loans
suggest there is not much room for negotiation. While this supports the assumption of
equal rates, it itself is innocuous for our result: as the relative cost of apartments with
high vs. low co-op debt changes (due to change in taxation), we do not observe relative
price changes.
5The gains from trade can be driven by a xed parameter, like in Stein (1995). In this
case the market is restricted to each agent trading only with its own type, but as we see
later this does not alter our main results.
6We will abstract from the following aspects: (1) Co-op screening. The co-op has veto
rights over new members, but in Sweden these rights are very weak. (2) Default. Rising
prices over the last decade have resulted in lower LTV-ratios for co-ops. When the leverage
is moderate, default is highly unlikely. In the sample used in the empirical section, the
great majority of LTV-ratios are below 0.25, implying that prices would have to fall by 75
percent to trigger default.
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Thus, a j type agents utility net of costs is given by
ui   (1   p)rPk   (1   c)rcjDk (1)
where (k = h; l), cu = 1 and cb = c < 1.
Each agent compares her current apartment with two new apartments
and chooses the apartment that maximizes her utility. For convenience,
we assume that during the search an agent views one apartment of either
capital structure (high or low co-op debt). Our results do not hinge on
this assumption - all we need is that apartments and apartment tastes are
su¢ ciently heterogeneous that a full separation, whereby either agent type
trades only with itself, does not occur.7
The supply of high and low co-op debt apartments is exogenous in the
model and is equal to s and 1   s, respectively. At the beginning of the
rst period, fraction x (y) of unbiased (biased) agents live in low debt
apartments, while the rest live in high debt apartments.
The market equilibrium is given by a price function
Ph   Pl = b( c;  p; c)(Dh  Dl) (2)
under which utility-maximizing trade results in a stable distribution of agent
types across apartment types, and markets clear: x + y(1   ) = s: We
can write this equilibrium as
(b( c;  p; c); x; y): (3)
3.1.1 Trading
Proposition 1 There is an equilibrium (b( c;  p; c); x; y) with b = bu +
(1   )bb, x = ((2sV + (1   )(bu   bb)(Dh   Dl))=(2V )) + 0:5 and y =
1
1 (s  x): The equilibrium price relationship is thus given by
Ph   Pl = 2sV   (bu + (1  )bb)(Dh  Dl) (4)
Proof : See Appendix A.
Our main hypothesis is that the co-op loans are not accurately reected
in market prices. To see whether this is true, the hypothesis b = bu will
7In Appendix A, we discuss the case where full market separation occurs. Are main
result are qualitatively unchanged.
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be rejected. In particular, b < bu unless c = 1, or  = 1 (or both), that
is, whenever there are agents who do not capitalize costs of debt fully into
prices.
3.1.2 Changing the tax rules
Proposition 2 The price response to a change in the relative cost of per-
sonal loans relative to co-op loans is smaller, in absolute terms, when some
agents are biased.
Proof: See Appendix A.
In the next section we provide an empirical test of the muted price re-
sponse, using sales prices of apartments and the associated co-operative debt,
before and after a tax reform, that reduced the cost of nancing coops with
personal debt.
4 An empirical test
Our survey results show that many apartment owners are unaware of co-op
loan size and interest rate, whereas they are well aware of their personal
loan size and interest rate, and the have not even considered the possibility
of replacing co-op loans with personal loans. These ndings corroborate
the view that co-op loans are less salient. Our model predicts that if lower
salience gives rise to a psychological benet then this bias may generate
market prices that depart from economic fundamentals.
In this section, we use sales data provided by the Swedish association
of real estate agents to examine whether co-op loans are fully capitalized in
apartment prices. The data set consists of approximately 18,000 transactions
taking place in central Stockholm during the period 2007-2009. Apart from
the price and time of the transaction, the data also contains information
about the apartments size (in m2 and the number of rooms), the age of the
building, whether the building has an elevator, what oor the apartment is
on, how many oors the building has and the location of the building (by
parish).
The question of whether co-op loans are capitalized in prices has recently
been addressed by Hjalmarsson and Hjalmarsson (2009) using a proxy for
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co-op debt. They examine the negative relationship between the sales price
and the present value of monthly fee payments to the co-op that are due to
underlying debt. The reason they base their analysis the present value of
co-op fees is that the available sales data does not contain information about
co-op loans.
We match sales data from the same source as Hjalmarsson and Hjalmars-
son (2009) with a proprietary database of co-op balance sheets, provided by
Boreda AB. The result is a unique data set in which we can observe the
co-op loan associated with each apartment in the sales data.8 The Boreda
database contains balance sheet information for the majority of the co-ops
in our market data, but we lose some observations. The matched sample
contains about 12,700 observations for the period 2007-2009.
Matching the two data sets allows us to test the capitalization hypothesis
directly, rather than through a proxy such as the present value of co-op fees.
Table 1 contains summary statistics for the entire matched sample. The co-
op loan is expressed in terms of the amount associated with the apartment
and not as the total sum over all apartments in the co-op. In addition, the
co-op loan is expressed as net debt, i.e. debt minus nancial assets (again,
at the apartment level), so in those cases where the co-op has nancial assets
exceeding its debt this variable takes on a negative value.
Table 1
Summary statistics, entire 2007-2009 sample.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Price in SEK 2,867,889 1,501,572 60,000 36,000,000
Co-op loan (net debt) in SEK 307,969 360,942 -234,962 7,325,087
Size in m2 59.27 29.68 8 560
Number of rooms 2.12 1.03 1 18
Age of building 74.61 34.36 0 507
Elevator 0.78 0.42 0 1
Floor 2.45 2.04 0 23
# Floors 3.45 2.96 1 24
As a simple framework for thinking about the capitalization of co-op
loans, we can draw on an analogy with corporate nance. Just like the value
8The data contains information about the total loans held by the co-op. It also contains
the fraction of co-op ownership (and debt service) associated with each apartment, thus
allowing us to identify the co-op loan associated with each apartment.
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of assets equals the sum of equity and debt, we can think of an apartment
having a market value V that is the sum of a co-op loan D and a market
price P . If personal loans and co-op loans are perfect substitutes and have
the same pecuniary cost, then the price P should simply be the net value of
the apartment less the co-op loan, i.e. P = V  D. Our regression framework
assumes that the set of hedonic variables X and their associated regression
coe¢ cients  are a good measure of the apartments value, i.e. V = X, and
hence P = XB D. This is essentially the same framework as in Hjalmarsson
and Hjalmarsson except that we use the actual co-op debtDi, rather than an
estimated present value of co-op fees. Letting Pi be the observed sales price
of apartment i, we can write the regression equation aAs shown in Figure
5, there are also noticeable but moderate price di¤erences between di¤erent
time periods in our pooled sample, including some indications of seasonal
variations, with prices rising in the rst half of the year and declining in the
second half. We include a set of time dummies, one for each of the twelve
quarters in the period 2007-2009, to control for these changes over time.
Pi =  +Xi + Di + "i (5)
where Di is the amount of co-op debt associated with apartment i and
Xi is a vector of controls, including the aforementioned apartment char-
acteristics as well as time and location xed e¤ects.Location is measured at
the parish level. As shown in Figure 4 there are noticeable but moderate
price di¤erences between the 14 parishes in central Stockholm, with square
meter prices spanning the 44,000-57,000 SEK. We include a dummy variable
for each of the 14 parishes to capture these di¤erences.
As shown in Figure 5, there are also noticeable but moderate price dif-
ferences between di¤erent time periods in our pooled sample, including some
indications of seasonal variations, with prices rising in the rst half of the
year and declining in the second half. We include a set of time dummies, one
for each of the twelve quarters in the period 2007-2009, to control for these
changes over time.
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Figure 4
Average price, by parish.
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Figure 5
Average price, by quarter.
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The coe¢ cient  reects the extent to which co-op loans are capitalized
in apartment prices. If the tax treatment of personal loans and co-op loans is
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similar, then we should expect the coe¢ cient  to be close to negative one (see
section 3.1 in Hjalmarsson and Hjalmarsson, 2009). In this case, a 100 SEK
increase in the size of the co-op loan associated with an apartment should
decrease the price by about 100 SEK. Hjalmarsson and Hjalmarsson (2009)
use the present value of fee payments, a proxy for debt, to estimate values
for  in the range [-0.5,-1.0] with  = -0.74 in their main specication. Their
estimate implies that a 100 SEK increase in the co-op loan associated with
apartment decreases its price by 74 SEK, i.e. less than full capitalization.
We have reason to expect the coe¢ cient  to be larger, in absolute terms,
because our data is from the period 2007-2009, whereas Hjalmarsson and
Hjalmarsson use data from 2002-2005. In October 2006 the government
announced a change to the tax rules for co-ops. The change which was im-
plemented 1 January 2007 abolished a supplementary annual housing tax on
co-ops that amounted to about 1 percent of the assessed value of the building.
Previously, co-op interest payments had been tax deductible against this tax.
at a rate of 28 percent (lowered to 26.3 percent in 2008). The deductibility of
co-op interest payments applied at the co-op level, and would be passed on
to the co-op residents in the form of lower co-op fees. Prior to the tax reform,
the economic value of the tax break for co-op loans was approximately com-
parable to the interest payments on personal loans which are tax deductible
at a rate of 30 percent. In the wake of the reform, there was no longer a
tax break for co-op loans, implying that they should become relatively less
attractive compared to co-op loans. A simple benchmark for the coe¢ cient
 would be the marginal rate of substitution given by the relative cost, net
of taxes, for the two types of loans, i.e.  1=(1  ), or about  1:4 at a tax
rate of 30 percent (see Appendix A for details).
Table 2 summarizes the results from four regressions aimed at estimating
. Column (1) is the baseline specication using all observations in the period
2007-2009.
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Table 2
Regression results: pooled regression.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline specification Excluding buildings older
than 10 years
Excluding top and bottom
deciles of co-op loans
Excluding co-ops with
commercial premises
Excluding small apartments
Co-op loan -0.14 -0.28 -0.27 -0.38 -0.17
[0.04]*** [0.10]*** [0.05]*** [0.10]*** [0.05]***
Size in m2 41,499.58 42,320.17 41,896.84 41,647.14 43,064.59
[1,681.73]*** [2,734.29]*** [1,784.01]*** [2,092.80]*** [2,900.69]***
2 rooms 63,735.03 117,193.09 59,098.67 82,431.05
[32,151.33]** [72,896.68] [31,342.13]* [43,073.92]*
3 rooms 284,214.72 158,958.46 290,805.68 274,709.87 -254,198.71
[75,988.45]*** [117,860.84] [76,999.77]*** [98,801.72]*** [164,099.09]
4 rooms 443,528.32 381,763.55 458,525.58 449,813.44 -137,217.81
[111,828.97]*** [168,778.28]** [115,469.94]*** [137,326.77]*** [117,007.18]
5 or more rooms 668,972.95 328,517.79 760,911.99 752,485.63
[173,731.39]*** [281,631.19] [197,232.75]*** [277,364.88]***
10-20 years old -95,597.70 -126,622.46 -177,069.86 -207,544.08
[36,136.91]*** [35,119.83]*** [163,323.75] [60,576.82]***
20-30 years old 49,940.67 -70,340.32 213,547.73 -5,289.93
[41,395.45] [47,131.34] [170,016.45] [66,510.49]
30-40 years old 156,559.57 8,302.76 124,625.35 -19,801.06
[38,225.88]*** [37,592.16] [112,285.35] [72,987.78]
40-50 years old 16,542.15 -96,094.37 0.00 -145,256.88
[38,556.37] [41,787.87]** [0.00] [78,393.28]*
50-60 years old 80,951.54 -53,934.00 156,629.37 -45,543.69
[50,423.83] [47,588.61] [637,427.35] [133,712.17]
60-70 years old 208,967.57 70,132.45 138,631.87 19,326.39
[33,649.10]*** [31,194.69]** [92,135.26] [95,548.41]
70-80 years old 304,291.05 178,768.23 265,204.08 334,129.65
[29,762.25]*** [27,367.02]*** [76,009.60]*** [66,014.35]***
80-90 years old 368,133.28 213,518.69 455,913.90 425,715.76
[31,675.32]*** [30,524.90]*** [88,961.32]*** [73,110.95]***
90-100 years old 501,026.59 360,171.00 538,334.06 519,296.75
[34,957.47]*** [34,126.61]*** [116,158.63]*** [73,630.11]***
100-110 years old 558,097.44 415,477.77 593,816.33 603,534.18
[35,757.08]*** [34,687.44]*** [85,392.27]*** [75,167.32]***
> 120 years old 582,732.49 446,802.70 566,948.48 567,592.68
[34,984.04]*** [33,735.77]*** [85,916.57]*** [72,688.58]***
Elevator 69,160.02 187,395.98 63,134.02 51,326.79 93,762.81
[12,050.92]*** [103,585.91]* [12,678.08]*** [38,164.21] [39,603.81]**
Floor 59,073.47 66,727.20 55,805.05 57,503.26 97,431.93
[2,712.73]*** [10,729.65]*** [2,756.91]*** [8,044.18]*** [7,237.36]***
# Floors -2,795.24 -18,462.98 -2,069.78 -2,525.42 -2,961.02
[1,549.34]* [6,193.57]*** [1,606.33] [4,278.36] [4,358.55]
Controls for:
Quarter dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Parish dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12,725 1,011 10,148 1,398 3,426
R-squared 0.88 0.77 0.89 0.88 0.77
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The main result is that co-op debt is greatly undercapitalized in apart-
ment prices. In the baseline specication, the coe¢ cient on co-op debt is
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-0.14, implying that a 100 SEK increase in the co-op loan associated with an
apartment decreases the price by 14 SEK.
Columns (2)-(5) contain four robustness checks. First, if co-op debt is in-
curred to undertake major building repairs, then a co-op might have low debt
because it has not yet undertaken such repairs and hence its apartments have
lower value. In column (2) we address this by excluding all buildings that
are older than 10 years. The estimated coe¢ cient for co-op loans increases
but only to -0.28, well below anything that would imply full capitalization of
co-op loans.
In column (3) we omit the top and bottom deciles of the co-op loan
distribution, to make sure that our results are not driven by extremes. The
estimated value for  is about the same as in column (2).
Our measure of co-op debt is net of nancial assets but does not include
real assets. With regard to the real value of the apartments, we assume
this is captured by the apartment and building characteristics in the regres-
sion. Some co-ops, however, also have real assets in the form of commercial
premises in the building. Our data does not have detailed information about
the value of any commercial premises that the co-op might have, but it does
allow us to identify whether a co-op has such premises or not. In column (4)
we omit all apartments in co-ops with any commercial premises at all. The
estimated value for  increases slightly in absolute size, to -0.38, but this is
still very far from anything that would imply full capitalization.
Another possible omitted variable might be liquidity constraints on behalf
of buyers, a hypothesis that we discuss more extensively in the discussion
section at the end of the paper. We may expect liquidity constraints to be
more severe for small apartments, since these can be expected to be more
popular with rst-time buyers who will not have realized capital gains on
previous properties and may not have accumulated enough other savings to
use as a down payment. In column (5) we exclude all apartments with less
than 3 rooms to test for the potential importance of liquidity constraint. A
similar strategy is used by Hjalmarsson and Hjalmarsson (2009). When we
restrict the sample in this way the estimated value for  is about the same
as in the baseline specication, -0.17.
Thus even when restricting the sample as in columns (2)-(5) the regression
estimates suggest that a 100 SEK increase in the co-op loan associated with
an apartment decreases its price by at most 38 SEK. This indicates that the
extent of undercapitalization is in fact considerably larger than that reported
in Hjalmarsson and Hjalmarsson (2009), despite the more disadvantageous
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tax treatment of co-op loans from 2007 onwards.
As an additional test, we look at how the estimated value for  is a¤ected
by a tax reform at the end of 2006. Our data stretches back to 2006, but
we excluded observations from 2006 from the regressions in table 2 because
di¤erent tax rules applied before 2007. Now we instead focus our attention
on how the coe¢ cients change if we t the regression in column (2) above to
observations from 2006 and 2007 respectively.
The supplementary housing tax on co-ops was abolished at the end of
2006. Since co-op interest rate payments were deductible against this tax
it was in e¤ect only paid by co-ops with little or no loans. For such co-ops
the change in tax rules resulted in a considerable cost reduction. Rational
consumers should have anticipated that co-ops with low leverage would either
(1) reduce their monthly fees in the future, or (2) maintain the same monthly
fee but increase the ow of services to the residents. Thus, in an e¢ cient
market we would expect the relative price of apartments with high and low co-
op loans to shift in favor of apartments with low co-op loans when comparing
sales in 2007 with sales in 2006. The relative price change should be captured
by the coe¢ cient  which should increase in magnitude following the tax
reform but our model predicts less response to changes in the relative cost of
the two types of loans if some of the market participants are biased in favor
of less salient co-op loans.
To examine how the capitalization of co-op loans was a¤ected by the
change in the tax treatment of co-ops, we t equation (5) to data from
2006 and 2007 separately and compare the coe¢ cients. Summary statistics
presented in the appendix show that these two subsamples are similar. Co-op
loan levels are closely similar and the di¤erence is not statistically signicant.
For some other variables, the di¤erence in means is statistically signicant
but small in magnitude. Price levels, however, are signicantly higher in
2007, consistent with the positive e¤ect one would expect from a lowering of
the e¤ective tax rate on the housing sector.
The data do not indicate that co-op loans were capitalized di¤erently in
2007 than in 2006, despite the tax reform. The estimated value for  is -0.16
for the 2006 sample and -0.15 for the 2007 sample. The standard errors are
0.04 and 0.05 respectively, implying that the two estimated values are not
signicantly di¤erent from one another. The regression results are reported
in full in the appendix.
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5 Discussion
It is well documented that many consumers fail to minimize borrowing costs.
Agarwal et al (2006) report that a substantial fraction of consumers choose
ex-post sub-optimal credit contracts.9 Many credit card holders fail to mini-
mize costs by switching to a cheaper available source of credit, such as another
credit card, checking balances or other liquid and low-yielding assets (Gross
and Souleles, 2002; Stango and Zinman, 2009). Consumers take out pay-
day loans at very high interest rates even when they have access to cheaper
sources of nancing (Agarwal et. al, 2009).
For many households, their home represents the bulk of their assets, and
their mortgage contract is the most important nancial contract they ever
enter into (Campbell and Cocco, 2003). Sweden, which is the focus of our
study, is no exception: real estate amounts to over 70% of household assets
(Campbell, 2006) and the total amount of mortgages outstanding is equiva-
lent to almost 60% of GDP.10 If households make poor mortgage choices it
may have serious consequences for their economic well-being and in countries
with deep credit markets it may also a¤ect nancial stability.
Yet many households pay considerably higher mortgage interest rates
than they need to, either by failing to renance their mortgages (Campbell,
2006; Agarwal et al, 2008) or by taking out a subprime mortgage when they
would have qualied for a prime mortgage (Lax et al, 2004). Campbell (2006)
reports indications that many households choose their mortgage product on
non-economic grounds. Borrowers also overpay brokers for mortgage origi-
nation (Woodward and Hall, 2010). In doing so, large amounts of money
are left on the table, leading Woodward and Hall to conclude that many
consumers are confused about mortgage origination and do not realize the
nancial costs of overpaying.
We add to the existing research by identifying an apparent ine¢ ciency
with regard to housing market debt. When buying co-op apartments, a co-op
loan associated with an apartment is far from fully capitalized in the price.
Our estimates suggest that an increase in the co-op loan of 100 SEK decreases
the price by about 20-30 SEK, despite the fact the personal mortgage loans
receive more favorable tax treatment.
9Switching is no panacea: Wilson and Waddams Price (2010) show that in the UK
electricity market about one in six consumers actually reduce their surplus by switching
supplier.
10Source: Swedish BankersAssociation.
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We argue that the observed outcomes may be the result of a bias in
favour of less salient loans. Empirical work in public economics has shown
that salience may be an important determinant of behavioral responses to
taxation, and a parallel literature in consumer nance shows that salience
of payments e¤ects consumerswillingness to spend. We outline a simple
model that predicts that when some fraction of market participants are biased
apartment prices will not fully reect the associated co-op loans. We test
this using market data and the resulting estimates suggest that co-op loans
are greatly undercapitalized in prices. The extent of undercapitalization is
considerably larger than that estimated by Hjalmarsson and Hjalmarsson
(2009) who use a proxy for co-op debt, rather than actual debt levels as we
do. In addition, the tax reform at the end of 2006 does not seem to have
changed the pricing of co-op loans, despite giving more disadvantageous tax
treatment to co-op loans relative to personal loans.
Our results add to the existing research on how behavioral biases may af-
fect the housing market (see, for example, Genovese and Mayer, 2001; Brun-
nermeier and Julliard, 2005; Mayer and Sinai 2007). We also extend the line
of inquiry in Hjalmarsson and Hjalmarsson (2009) in several ways. First, we
identify plausible microfoundations for why prices may depart from economic
fundamentals. At the individual level, Hjalmarsson and Hjalmarsson (2009)
dont o¤er an explanation for why individual assessments should be biased
in one direction. By contrast, we suggest that some market participants dis-
play a bias in favor of less salient loans, and present survey evidence that
corroborate this view. Second, we address the question of whether this bias
may a¤ect market prices also in the presence of unbiased market participants.
Our model shows that under reasonable assumptions equilibrium prices may
depart from economic fundamentals even when only a fraction of the market
is biased. Third, our empirical strategy is broader: We use actual debt levels,
rather than a proxy, and we examine not only the extent of capitalization in
pooled data but also the change in the capitalization following a tax reform
that a¤ected the relative cost of the two types of loans.
Co-op loans are less salient but they are also more costly, and a bias in
favor of less salient co-op loans may impose substantial costs on individual
households. The money left on the table can be large, as illustrated by the
numerical example presented in Table 3. The example is based on a personal
loan of 2 million SEK, equal to the average price of a Stockholm apartment
in 2007. The co-op loan associated with the apartment is 1 million SEK,
implying that the value of the apartment is 3 million. At an interest rate of
20
5 percent, the apartment owner could reduce their monthly borrowing cost
by about 1,250 SEK (about 180 USD) by substituting a personal loan for
the co-op loan. The monthly saving is equivalent to about 6% of the average
pre-tax monthly wage.11
Table 3
Potential cost reduction: a numerical example
co-op personal co-op personal
Apartment A 3,000,000 1,000,000 2,000,000 4,167 5,833 10,000
Apartment B 3,000,000 0 3,000,000 0 8,750 8,750
Difference 0 -1,000,000 1,000,000 -4,167 2,917 -1,250
Value of
apartment
Loan financing
Interest net of taxes, per
month
Total interest
payments, per
month
Despite the costs imposed on individual households, co-op debt remains
prevalent. Co-op debt has in fact been increasing steadily, despite the higher
cost following the tax reform at the end of 2006 (Source: Statistics Sweden,
2010b). The pattern applies to overall debt as well as the average debt per
square meter, as shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6
Aggregate stock of co-op loans 2005-2008
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11Source: Statistics Sweden. SEK 18,000  USD 2,600.
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The popularity of co-op debt, despite the disadvantageous tax treatment,
may in part be due to some households being borrowing constrained. If banks
are unwilling to lend to households but are willing to lend to the co-ops inhab-
ited by those same households, then co-op debt may be a way to circumvent
borrowing constraints, albeit at a high price. On the other hand, disposible
income net of co-op fees and interest payments are key determinants when
the banks approve mortgage loans, and collateral requirements are typically
very low (see, for example, Finansinspektionen, 2010). Using co-op loans
instead of personal loans reduces the individuals disposible income by an
amount equal to 30 percent of the interest paid. That borrowing constraints
also play a part is an interesting prior that merits further study, but to the
best of our knowledge there is no research showing that a signicant share
of Swedish co-op residents are borrowing constrained. By contrast, we have
documented that many apartment owners have poor awareness of the details
of their co-op loan compared to their personal mortgage loan. We have also
outlined a model that predicts that a bias in favor of less salient co-op loans
may distort prices in equilibrium. The market data that we examine are
consistent with this prediction.
Do co-op residents really need to know the terms of the co-opsloans in
order to make economically rational choices? Possibly not. The co-op fee
might in fact be a su¢ cient proxy. But this does not diminish the fact that
most of the respondents in our survey, including present and former co-op
board members, had never reected on the substitutability of co-op loans and
personal loans. This insight is clearly essential if one is to envisage anything
like the correct optimization problem for which either the co-op loan or a
proxy like the co-op fee is an input. Individuals lacking this insight will most
likely be engaging in mental accounting, treating co-op loans and personal
loans as fundamentally separate parts of their personal nances. Their low
awareness of co-op loans are likely to prevent them from perceiving the cost
of doing so.
What economic policies might mitigate the bias and its e¤ects on market
equilibrium? It is quite possible that regulation could go some way in reduc-
ing the scope for costly mistakes in this market. Regulation, however, often
comes at the cost of imposing restrictions on all market participants. It is
important to consider both costs and benets of di¤erent policy options. To
give an example, the problem of sub-optimal capital structures could clearly
be dealt with by simply banning co-op leverage. We believe this to be an
unwise policy choice. Short-term debt is a convenient way for co-ops to dis-
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tribute unforeseen expenditures, such as the need to adjust the premises to
t new building laws, over slightly longer time periods. Banning such debt
might protect naive consumers, but also imposes an inconvenience cost on
all consumers in the market.
We suggest two policies that would reduce the scope for mistakes without
signicant infringements on consumer choice. First, the co-op monthly fee
could be itemized so that it is readily apparent what fraction of the fee is
used for service and maintenance on the one hand, and interest payments
on the other hand. This increases the salience of co-op loans. Second, real
estate agents could be encouraged to disclose the co-op loan associated with
an apartment in their advertisements. This information can be inferred from
a co-ops annual statement. It is unlikely, however, that consumers will read
annual statements and make the necessary calculations at the early stages of
choosing an apartment. Proving the information in the advertisement itself
would serve as a timely reminder to the consumer that the value of assets
is the sum of equity and debt, and facilitate quick comparisons between
apartments with di¤erent capital structures.
Both policies would be inexpensive to implement and would help con-
sumers make more informed decisions. We believe that both policies would
be well suited to eld experiments, and encourage further research along
these lines.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
Denote ui
(1 p)r = vi 2 [ V ;V ]; V = U(1 p)r ; bu =
(1 c)
(1 p) and bc =
(1 c)c
(1 p) .
The utility expression (1) can be now rewritten as (vi P  bjD)(1   p)r:By
assumption each agent considers one apartment with high debt and one with
low debt. Both types may settle for an apartment with high or low debt,
depending on which gives them the higher utility given the realization of the
random variable v. Agent i of type j will trade her current apartment with
high co-op debt level Dh (and a realized valuation of v0) for an apartment of
co-op debt level Dl if the following two conditions hold:
vli   Pl   bjDl > v0   Ph   bjDh (A.6)
and
vli   Pl   bjDl > vui   Ph + bjDh (A.7)
where vli denotes the utility from the low debt apartment. Ph and Pl are the
prices of high debt and low debt apartments. It reects both the psychological
benet of less salient co-op loans and the value of the tax shield. Condition
(A.6) states that the agent will move to a new apartment if the net utility
from living in the new low debt apartment less the costs of purchasing it
exceeds what the agent earns by staying in the initial high debt apartment
(subscript 0).
The demand by an agent of type j living in a low debt l apartment
(high debt) for an apartment of low debt is denoted by l;lj (
h;l
j ) (it is the
probability that the agent will end up in an l debt apartment). Thus, l;lu :
is equal to:
l;lu = Pfvli   Pl   buDl > vhi   Ph   buDhg
 (Pfvli > v0g+ Pfvli < v0g)
= PfPh   Pl + bu(Dh  Dl) + vli > vhi g
=
Ph   Pl + bu(Dh  Dl)
2V
+ 0:5
since vhi and v
h
i are random draws from a uniform distribution.
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Similarly,
h;hu = Pfvhi   Ph   buDh > vli   Pl   buDlg
 (Pfvhi > v0g + Pf vhi < v0g)
=
Pl   Ph + bu(Dl  Dh)
2V
+ 0:5
By denition,
h;lu = 1  h;hu (A.8)
Thus, h;lu = 
l;l
u : The total demand by agents of type j = u for low
co-op debt apartments is given by the sum of those moving from low debt
apartments and those moving from high debt apartments
lu = x
l;l
u + (1  x)h;lu =
Ph   Pl + bu(Dh  Dl)
2V
+ 0:5 (A.9)
Similarly, for biased agents, by only changing the discount factor,
l;lb =
Ph   Pl + bb(Dh  Dl)
2V
+ 0:5 (A.10)
Also, h;lb = 1  h;hb and
h;hb = Pfvhi   Ph   bbDh > vli   Pl   bbDlg
 (Pfvhi > v0g+ Pfvhi < v0g)
=
Pl   Ph + bb(Dl  Dh)
2V
+ 0:5
The total demand by agents of type j = b for low co-op debt apartments
is given by
lb = y
l;l
b + (1  y)h;lb =
Ph   Pl + bb(Dh  Dl)
2V
+ 0:5 (A.11)
The total demand by two types of agents for low debt apartments must
be equal to its supply:
lu + (1  )lb = s (A.12)
Respectively,
bu + (1  )bb = 1  s (A.13)
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and thus
Ph   Pl = 2sV   (bu + (1  )bb)(Dh  Dl) (A.14)
Distribution
To assure that the distribution is stable, it must be that h;lu = 
l;h
u (and
hence h;lb = 
l;h
b ). The equilibrium level of the distribution of agent types
x solves the following:
x(1  l;lu ) = (1  x)h;lu (A.15)
implying that
x =
2sV   (bu + (1  )bb)(Dh  Dl) + bu(Dh  Dl)
2V
+ 0:5(A.16)
=
2sV + (1  )(bu   bb)(Dh  Dl)
2V
+ 0:5 (A.17)
Similarly,
y =
1
1  (s  x
) (A.18)
=
2sV + (bu   bb)(Dh  Dl)
2V
+
0:5
1   (A.19)
Proof of proposition 2
After the tax removal, b
0
u =
1
1 p ; b
0
b =
c
1 p : In an e¢ cient market bu b
0
u =
1 c
1 p   11 p =  c1 p <   c1 p + (1  ) cc1 p < 0;
where the last expression derives from (4):
A.1 Market Separation
As an extension, consider the case where there is no heterogeneity in apart-
ments or apartment tastes (V = 0) but (agents still trade according to
(A.6) and (A.7) ).
In the market with unbiased agents (e¢ cient markets), the annual cost
of living in either type of the apartment (given similar valuations) would be
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the same and equal to
(1   p)rPh + (1   c)rcuDh = (1   p)rPl + (1   c)rcuDl (A.20)
where cu = 1:This in turn implies that in the separate market with unbi-
ased agents
Ph +
(1   c)rcu
(1   p)r Dh = Pl +
(1   c)rcu
(1   p)r Dl (A.21)
Similarly, in the separate market with biased agents
Ph +
(1   c)rcb
(1   p)r Dh = Pl +
(1   c)rcb
(1   p)r Dl (A.22)
The pricing relationship is hence given by Ph Pl = bb(Dh Dl) and Ph 
Pl = bu(Dh   Dl) in the biased and unbiased agentsmarkets, respectively,
and thus the average price will be similar to the one in equation 8 (V = 0).
Appendix B
Table A1
Summary statistics: comparing 2006 and 2007
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Price in SEK 2,564,168 1,332,237 3,063,253 1,603,534 -18.95
Co-op loan (net debt) in SEK 290,957 365,399 287,739 323,258 0.46
Size in m2 58.04 28.76 59.28 29.94 2.33
Number of rooms 2.04 1.01 2.13 1.04 -4.49
Age of building 77.08 31.88 75.62 31.70 2.55
Elevator 0.76 0.43 0.76 0.43 -0.09
Floor 2.11 1.92 2.56 2.02 -12.62
# Floors 2.87 2.80 3.68 2.84 -15.93
2006 2007 t-test, equality
of means
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Table A2
Regression results: comparing 2006 and 2007.
(1) (2)
Year = 2006 Year = 2007
Co-op loan -0.16 -0.15
[0.04]*** [0.05]***
Size in m2 37,477.08 45,311.12
[1,200.09]*** [1,203.56]***
2 rooms 81,303.63 25,619.59
[24,577.91]*** [25,174.24]
3 rooms 279,718.20 211,699.35
[55,074.11]*** [58,446.26]***
4 rooms 365,770.11 377,843.34
[79,709.68]*** [86,343.38]***
5 or more rooms 456,602.76 446,853.50
[133,846.82]*** [155,448.82]***
10-20 years old -139,291.48 -174,950.55
[63,475.45]** [70,405.85]**
20-30 years old -35,298.18 21,666.67
[63,589.17] [84,697.37]
30-40 years old 3,235.46 -194.95
[56,906.56] [74,734.74]
40-50 years old -57,344.00 -50,599.54
[66,904.76] [70,077.45]
50-60 years old 112,380.83 -119,945.18
[69,693.77] [97,366.17]
60-70 years old 208,463.38 133,504.04
[54,684.27]*** [54,366.22]**
70-80 years old 229,821.19 223,085.44
[51,202.31]*** [51,737.99]***
80-90 years old 271,280.73 249,544.47
[59,331.71]*** [56,368.01]***
90-100 years old 322,706.15 369,709.00
[55,274.10]*** [58,663.83]***
100-110 years old 401,733.05 447,712.56
[55,687.34]*** [61,109.64]***
> 120 years old 417,723.21 470,812.48
[56,793.04]*** [59,093.94]***
Elevator 71,037.38 35,020.79
[13,604.68]*** [16,439.05]**
Floor 46,488.99 66,015.37
[3,804.47]*** [4,610.80]***
# Floors -1,627.00 -5,497.34
[2,303.39] [2,822.36]*
Controls for:
Quarter dummies Yes Yes
Parish dummies Yes Yes
Observations 5,158 4,644
R-squared 0.88 0.89
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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